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 This paper argues that Qatar exercises soft power influence in a troubled region via 
attraction and “carrots”. The sources of attraction includes: Qatar’s political stability derived 
from its military alliance with the U.S and effective income redistribution policies and a 
progressive higher education system which have greatly enhanced the stature of Qatar in the 
Middle East. Qatar offers the following “carrots” for influence: the potency of its Aljazeera 
Network, “carrot diplomacy”, sports investments and a generous foreign aid policy. However, 
the efficacy of these tools could be undermined, by the lack of a democratic culture in Qatar, 
questionable associations and causes, the unsustainable trajectory of “carrot” diplomacy and a 
creeping shift towards hard power in resolving conflicts and its attendant backlash. 
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Introduction: 
 This paper seeks to explore how Qatar exerts soft power influence in its foreign policy 
and its attendant challenges. Since Joseph Nye pioneered the concept of soft power, there 
have been numerous articles on how countries are exerting soft power influence. However, 
most of these articles have disproportionately focused on the same traditional great powers 
that dominate international politics in the exercise of hard power such as the U.S, China, 
Russia and other European powers. Thus the focus on Qatar offers a departure from a great 
power exercising any form of power and demonstrates how a small country can punch above 
its weight by exerting soft power influence and shaping the course of history in the Middle 
East.  
 Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes 
one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”1 Nye notes that “one can 
affect other’s behavior in three main ways: threats of coercion (sticks), inducements and 
payments (‘carrots’), and attraction that makes others want what you want.”2 Also, soft-power 
relies on three main resources: cultural - places where it is attractive; political values -when 
the promoter adheres to them at home and abroad; and foreign policies- regarded as legitimate 
and having moral authority3. In this regard, this paper argues that Qatar relies on attraction 
and “carrots” in its exercise of soft power. Qatar’s relative political stability in a turbulent 
region derived from a strong military alliance with the U.S and the effective redistribution of 
wealth among its citizens constitute a major source of attraction within its sphere of influence 
in the Middle East. In addition, the image of the Aljazeera media network as the voice of the 
powerless coupled with a progressive higher educational system is shaping the hearts and 
minds of thousands of people within the region. In terms of “carrots”, the volume and scope 
of Qatar’s foreign aid, sports investments and “carrot” diplomatic efforts is a major boost for 
its attempt at soft power. However, these could be derailed by the following: creeping 
                                                          
1 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 616 (2008), 94 
2  Ibid 
3J. Nye, Soft power: The Means to Success in World Politics, p.11.  
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utilization of “sticks” in the form of military intervention in Libya and Syria, questionable 
associations and causes, the unsustainable trajectory of “carrot” diplomacy and the risk of 
negative backlash. 
 
Soft Power by Attraction 
Dividends of U.S./Qatar Military Alliance 
 Although Qatar is not a democratic country in the liberal sense and thus hardly a 
symbol for liberal democratic ideals in practice that is worthy of universal admiration and 
attraction, it still has some indirect hard-power that that makes it attractive within its sphere of 
influence in the Middle East. This is because, “Military power can also be an attraction to 
those who wish to be on the winning side - or at least wish to avoid being on the losing side. 
Military units can be used for disaster relief”4. In this regard, Qatar’s military alliance with 
the U.S and its hosting of the U.S. military base, CENTCOM has bolstered its image in the 
region to the point of mute attraction and awe which constitute soft power. For example, the 
U.S/Qatar military alliance enabled Qatar to engage in military humanitarian intervention in 
Libya, addition to the hard power participation in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. 
 Furthermore, it inoculates Qatar against any immediate regional threat and preserves 
the power and authority of the Al-Thani dynasty as would be provocateurs would have to 
contend with the full might of the sole Super-power in the world which has vested military 
and economic interest in Qatar. Second, the U.S military alliance also enhances the image of 
Qatar regionally and worldwide as a stable country that has the approval and ear of the sole 
Super-power thereby enabling Qatar to leverage this benefit into soft power influence in 
places where Qatar can serve as an interlocutor between the U.S and its Middle Eastern and 
Muslim friends, who are wary and suspicious of U.S motives.  
 
Effective Distribution of National Wealth 
 Qatar stands out in a region where there is massive disenchantment against the ruling 
elites for their failure to effectively manage their respective economies and distribute 
immense wealth from oil sales. It is therefore not surprising that Qatar remains unscathed by 
the Arab Spring phenomenon. Through this default mode, Qatar has become the proverbial 
one-eyed man in the kingdom of the blind, worthy of everyone’s leadership.  
Qatar is blessed with the double fortune of immense natural resources and a small 
population which has enabled the leadership to formulate an uncontested domestic and 
foreign policy at home. According to the 2008 Economist intelligence report, Qatar had a 
GDP per capita per person of a whopping $448, 246. This level of wealth has insulated Qatar 
from the socio-economic discontent that has led to the political turmoil of the Arab Spring. 
The Qatari state has proven itself to be an effective distributor of wealth to its citizens through 
public sector employment, grants of land to citizens and the provision of subsidized goods 
and services. This is in contrast to other countries in the region such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain 
and Oman where a complex demographic mix and increasing population continue to pose a 
strain on wealth distribution5.  
 Indeed there is evidence to show that Qataris are content with the wealth distribution. 
According to the results of the third annual Arab Youth Survey published in March 2011 by 
the Dubai based Public relations firm, Asda’a Burson-Marstellar, the percentage of 
respondents who ranked democracy as important had fallen from 68% in 2008 to just 33% in 
2010. Instead, two-thirds of the respondents placed a higher premium on stability and living 
in safe neighborhoods. These results show that Qataris are content with what they are 
                                                          
4 Dan Blatt, review of The Paradox of American Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 4 (2002):3.  
5 Kristain Ulrichsen. “Qatar: Emergence of a Regional Power with International Reach.” E-International 
Relations, 2102,  http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/23/qatar-emergence-of-a-regional-power-with-international-
reach/ (25 June, 2013) 
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currently receiving and have made a rational calculation that the cost of rocking the status quo 
was not worth the hassle. It is therefore not surprising that the Arab Spring has passed Qatar 
by.6  Indeed, this contentment quiets the home front and gives the government the breathing 
space to be more active in foreign affairs. 
 However, Nye warns that military and economic superiority is frequently not enough 
to achieve a desired outcome as history does not always favor the side with the biggest 
battalions or the deepest pockets. Furthermore, the player with the strongest power hand is not 
always destined to carry the day. Therefore, "Converting resources into realized power in the 
sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership. 
Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge -- witness Japan and 
Germany in 1941 or Saddam Hussein in 1990."7 
 
Progressive Higher Education System 
 One of the major sources of attraction that has traditionally enabled the U.S and its 
western allies to exercise soft power is a strong and reputable higher education system that 
attracts thousands of people to study in U.S and other western educational institutions. Over 
the years, the U.S has been offering several scholarships to other nationalities via institutional 
programs such as the Fulbright and Marshall Programs. These are aided by other non-
governmental programs such as the Ford foundation and the George Soros financed Open 
Society program. It is instructive to know that former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan was 
a beneficiary of a Ford foundation scholarship just as President Obama’s father was in the 
sixties. It is no coincidence that the U.S strongly backed the candidacy of Kofi Annan, an 
MIT Alumnus, for the post of the U.N Secretary General. Having been educated in the U.S, 
Washington considered him a known entity in contrast to his unknown fellow African 
competitor, the former foreign minister of Tanzania, Ahmed Salim Salim.  
 The foreign policy benefits of such educational opportunities for host governments are 
immeasurable. First, higher educational institutions offer a non controversial avenue to shape 
the hearts and minds of future elites from other countries who will assume leadership 
positions in their respective countries. Such elites are more likely to have forged strong ties 
with their counterparts in wherever they received their education and are more amendable to 
deal making rather than confrontation. Second, educational opportunities help demystify the 
fear of the other as both U.S and international students are able to overcome entrenched 
stereotypes and misperceptions about each other through their interaction on various 
campuses. This is helpful for future cooperation between the host country and the countries of 
origin of the students. Nye points out that personal contact serves a vital channel for soft 
power. For example, "Most of China's leaders have a son or daughter educated in the States 
who can portray a realistic view of the United States that is often at odds with the caricatures 
in official propaganda”8. 
 Thanks to its huge oil and gas revenue, Qatar continues to invest heavily in the 
improvement of education, making the country the world leader in terms of the percentage of 
GDP spent on education. In addition, the literacy rate stands at 93 percent and 88.6 percent of 
girls are able to read and write, which is the highest percentage in the Arab world.9 In the last 
few years, Qatar has aggressively courted and has been successful in getting prestigious U.S 
universities to open branches in Qatar where they offer the same degrees as the parent 
universities in the U.S. In pursuance of this strategy of attracting foreign universities, Qatar 
                                                          
6 Ibid  
7  Dan Blatt, review of Soft Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 6 (2004):5 
8 Dan Blatt, review of Soft Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 6 (2004):9 
9 Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index, “BTI 2012 Qatar Country Report,” BTI, 2012, 
http://www.btiproject.de/fileadmin/Inhalte/reports/2012/pdf/BTI%202012%20Qatar.pdf (20 June, 2013) 
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has built an education city in order to concentrate all the Universities in the same area. 
Notable among these Universities are Carnegie Mellon University, Georgetown University, 
Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College and Texas A & M 
University.10 
 These institutions have become very popular in the Middle East as it is obvious that 
for these universities to be viable in the long run, they would have to go beyond the small 
pool of prospective Qatari applicants and instead tap into the greater Middle East for 
prospects. Herein lays the soft power impact of Qatar on Middle Easterners and other 
foreigners who are attracted by the aforementioned universities in Qatar. Many of the Middle 
Eastern students are going to be the elites in their respective countries and as such the 
relationships that they forge with Qataris and other international students’ coupled with their 
live experiences living in Qatar are going to make them much more tolerant of Qatari foreign 
policies in the future if not susceptible. Furthermore, schools in Qatar’s education city serve 
as a credible alternative for higher education for Arabs who are hesitant to pursue higher 
education in the West either as a result of visa restrictions or cultural considerations. This 
adds to the growing prestige of Qatar in the Middle East and their ability to shape the minds 
of current and future generations of Middle Eastern and Muslim elites. It is instructive to also 
note that most of the faculty members at these universities are Westerners who are primed to 
shape the hearts and minds of future Arab leaders towards moderation, a foreign policy goal 
of Qatar.  
 It is noteworthy that during the Cold War, U.S Soft power influences in the form of 
cultural exchanges and the thousands of international students who came to study in the U.S 
created a significant advantage for the U.S over its Cold War adversaries. Nye has observed 
that some of the pioneer international students from the Soviet Union played a pivotal role in 
the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union as they eventually rose to positions of influence upon 
their return home and began challenging the status quo from within.11 
 Apart from helping in the molding of the future elites of the Middle East, Qatar is also 
shaping the foreign policy agenda of the region by inviting scholars and academics to attend 
conferences that focus on priority issues of the Qatari government. For example, in his 
capacity as Chair of the Qatar Foundation, H.E. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Ali-Al Thani, holds 
annual summits in Doha to discuss new ideas about innovations, inventions and technologies. 
The theme of the 2009 inaugural summit was global education and how people around the 
world should cooperate to achieve something great.12 Participants of these summits represent 
leading and emerging voices from their countries and they are not impervious to presentations 
from like-minded people and their Qatari hosts.  
 
Aljazeera Media Influence 
 Unlike the U.S and other major European powers that have are widely associated with 
certain desirable ideals and values which enable them to exert soft power influence around the 
world, Qatar until recently was a relatively unknown country. However, the establishment of 
the Aljazeera media empire by the Qatari government in 1996 has given the country 
unprecedented exposure in the world as Qatar is now synonymous with the famous Aljazeera 
brand which is now universally recognizable. The ability of any country to exert soft power 
influence by promoting its ideals or values depends largely on its ability to tout the utility of 
the proposed ideals via a medium that the targeted audience trusts or derives its information 
from. Over the years, the U.S and Great Britain have had major successes promoting their 
                                                          
10 Helen Ziegler, “International Universities in Qatar”. Helen Ziegler & Associates, n.d, 
http://www.hziegler.com/articles/international-universities-in-qatar.html (25 June, 2013). 
11Dan Blatt, review of Soft Power by Joseph Nye, Futurecasts 6 (2004): 34 
12 World Innovation Summit for Education, “WISE Initiative”. WISE, N.D., http://www.wise-qatar.org/ (20 June 
2013)   
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ideals around the world via their dominance of the major media sources such as CNN, BBC 
and Voice of America just to mention a few. However, the duopoly of American and British 
Media dominance has been broken by Aljazeera since its inceptions in 1996 and it remains a 
force in influencing the attitudes and minds of people in the Middle East. 
 In fact Hillary Clinton in a March 2, 20011, Congressional testimony cited the 
increasing influence of Al Jazeera in her argument for more Congressional funding to execute 
what she termed the “information war” which she declared the U.S was losing. 
Acknowledging the soft power influence of Aljazeera, she testified as follows: 
 Al Jazeera has been the leader in that are literally changing people’s minds and 
attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective...In fact viewership of Al Jazeera is going 
up in the United States because it’s real news. You may not agree with it, but you feel like 
you’re getting real news around the clock instead of a million commercials and, you know, 
arguments between talking heads and the kind of stuff that we do on our news which, you 
know, is not particularly informative to us, let alone foreigners.”13 
 Aljazeera has been providing its audience with different perspectives on the ‘hot 
button’ global issues which counters the western news media’s narrative thereby carving a 
niche for itself as captured by its motto “The View and the Other Point of View”. In addition, 
Aljazeera has built a reputation for breaking the media norms of the Arab world which shies 
away from critiquing or questioning officialdom. Instead, the network is widely praised for 
giving opposition groups the forum to condemn their repressive governments.”14  
 The international profile of Qatar in the midst of the Arab Spring has been greatly 
enhanced, particularly in the Middle East as a result of the coverage of Aljazeera. The average 
man on the streets of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria is more likely to view Qatar as siding 
with the powerless because its news organization is telling and showing the world their 
struggles for freedom and democracy. Buttressing this point, Kinninmont, notes that “Al-
Jazeera now wins global accolades for its cutting-edge coverage of the Arab Spring. It has 
been the only Arab broadcaster to make serious inroads with western audiences, challenging 
the stereotype that globalization must mean westernization.”15 
 Aljazeera has diversified its coverage to include sports, documentaries, local news and 
children’s programs in addition to its highly acclaimed English-language current-events 
channel that features an ensemble of top notch Western journalists. Although the network 
may be popular in the State Department’s cafeteria in Washington, the network is unfairly 
tagged as a promoter of jihad in certain quarters of American society thereby limiting its 
expansion in the American media landscape.16 However, the recent acquisition of Current TV 
by Aljazeera offers the possibility of Aljazeera gaining about 40 million American customers 
for its proposed Aljazeera America Network.17 The ability of Aljazeera to broadcast into the 
homes of millions of Americans may go a long way to change the attitudes of Americans 
towards Muslims and the Middle East in general. If this happens, it will be a novelty in the 
sense that it will be the first time that a smaller country via the power of its media empire is 
exerting soft power influence on the super-power of the world.  
                                                          
13 Kirit.Radia,“Sec. of State Hillary Clinton: Aljazeera is ‘Real News’, U.S. Losing 
‘InformationWar’”ABCNEWS, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/03/sec-of-state-hillary-clinton-
al-jazeera-is-real-news-us-losing-information-war/ (20 June, 2013) 
14 Jerremy M. Sharp, “The Al Jazeera News Net work. Opportunity or Challenges for U.S,” Library Of Congress 
Washington Dc Congressional Research Service, 2003, 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA476202 (25 June 2013) 
15Jane  Kinninmont, “From Football to Military Might, How Qatar Wields Global Power”, Guardian, 2013,  
www.guardian.co.uk/.../2013/feb/.../qatar-tiny-gulf-state-global-force (20 June 2013) 
16 The Economist, “Al Jazeera Must do Better: The Arabs’ Premier Television Network Bids for American 
Viewers,” The Economist, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21569429-arabs-
premier-television-network-bids-american-viewers-must-do-better 
17 Ibid 
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“Carrots” for Soft Power 
“Carrot” Diplomacy 
 Qatar uses its enormous wealth from natural resources as a tool for its foreign policy 
in order to build its regional and international profile. However, Qatar lacks the organic 
influence that other countries have over others such as Saudi's religious influence, America 
democratic influence and China's economic influence. As a result of this, Qatar is increasingly 
relying on its financial muscle when mediating conflicts by promising huge sums of money 
after a peaceful settlement to build up infrastructure and so on. I term this “Carrot 
Diplomacy.” For war torn and cash strapped countries, Qatar’s offer of “carrots” for peace is a 
noble cause. 
 In order to achieve its diplomatic objectives, Qatar relies on two types of diplomacy. 
The first is diplomatic mediation, which seeks to project an image of Qatar’s as a neutral 
intermediary that can be relied upon and interested in peace and stability in the region. Qatar 
uses diplomacy to maximize its interests and influence on countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, 
Yemen and Sudan that have traditionally fallen under Saudi Arabian influence thereby 
upending the mantle of domination and influence of a strong regional hegemon. 
 The second mode of diplomacy employed by Qatar is public diplomacy through the 
media, where it presents Aljazeera as the voice of the people and an open platform for the 
voiceless. Diplomatic and public diplomacy is often integrated whereby Al Jazeera highlights 
conflicts that Qatar mediates. Most of Qatar’s diplomatic interventions are aimed at defusing 
crisis, or relieving tension, and not necessarily resolving the the conflict. However, Qatar’s 
modus operandi is being tested by the Arab Spring whereby Qatar is now compelled to shirk 
its impartiality cloak and instead take sides. Thus, Qatar has attained a respectable regional 
and international reputation that does not commensurate with its small size and limited 
military capability all through a deliberate policy where it uses its tremendous resources as 
carrots and sticks.  
 As part of its public diplomacy strategy, Qatar pursue a deliberate type of diplomacy 
which has been described as “Niche Diplomacy, “defined as the targeting of “resources in 
specific areas able to generate returns worth having.”18 In line with this strategy, Qatar has 
devoted resources in six areas with the hope of exerting soft power influence to solve some of 
the most vexing conflicts in the Middle East. The first strategy is serving as an unbiased 
interlocutor between two conflicting parties that Qatar has good relations with. In pursuance 
of this Qatar offered to open an office for the Taliban in Doha in order to facilitate peace talks 
between the Taliban and the Karzai government and also between the Taliban and the 
Americans.  
 The second strategy involves Qatar using its good offices to mediate intra faction 
conflicts by hosting reconciliation meetings among feuding factions in the region. For 
example, Qatar has hosted several reconciliation meetings between Hamas and Fatah in a bid 
to unite them for the much bigger challenge of speaking with one voice against Israel and 
ending the destruction intra faction political turf wars that undermines Palestinian unity. Also 
in November 2012, Qatar hosted a conference in its capital Doha which brought all the 
opposition forces against the Assad regime. At the conference an agreement was signed 
among the Syrian opposition to form a Syrian National Coalition of the Opposition and 
Revolutionary Forces in a bid to better coordinate their resistance against the Assad regime.  
 The third strategy is that Qatar hosts big multilateral conferences as it did in hosting 
the largest conference on United Nations Convention on Climate change from November 26- 
December 6, 2012 with about 17,000 participants. Prior to this, Qatar hosted the now famous 
WTO Ministerial Conference known as the Doha round of talks in 2001 which sought to 
                                                          
18 Carl Ungerer, “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy.” The Journal of Politics and 
History 53 (2007):548 
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commit all countries to negotiate for open agricultural and manufacturing markets and 
enhanced intellectual property rights protections.  
 The fifth strategy which is perhaps the most controversial is Qatar increasingly 
becoming the preferred destination for many political dissents in the region sometimes to the 
discomfort and displeasure of some of its international and regional allies. For example Qatar 
hosts Khaled Meshaal the political head of Hamas after the latter abandoned his patron Assad 
in the wake of the Syrian uprising. Although the Qatari move has been interpreted as an 
attempt to wean Hamas off its Iranian/Syria influence and thereby moderate its outlook, Tel 
Aviv and Washington D.C are quite wary. Similarly, Qatar host a number of prominent 
Islamic Brotherhood dissidents that have been expelled from Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E 
creating a sour spot in an otherwise excellent relationship among the three nations. On the 
other hand, Qatar has dangled the prospect of a comfortable asylum to key actors in some of 
the conflicts in the Middle East in order to entice them to defect and assist in ending a 
conflict. For example, in August 2012 the former Prime Minister of Syria Riad Hijab defected 
from the regime and headed quickly to Qatar. In addition, Qatar granted Asylum to the former 
foreign minister of Libya in the Gaddafi Regime Mousa Kousa in the heat of NATO’s attack 
on Gaddafi’s forces.  
 The last strategy involves Qatar projecting its diplomatic efforts through its Aljazeera 
network and highlighting its mediation initiatives to the region and the world at large. This 
goes a long way to enhance the reputation of Qatar in the world and the public opinion in 
places where Qatar is mediating peace. According to Nye “Shaping public opinion becomes 




 Sports are non-controversial tools that bring nations together and enhance the 
reputation and image of countries that excel in them or host successful events. That is why 
many countries have traditionally invested heavily in the preparation of their athletes for 
major worldwide sporting events. For example, in the height of the Cold War, the Olympics 
became a proxy battle field between the East and West to the point where some of the Eastern 
bloc members such as Eastern Germany deemed it necessary to dope their athletes in order to 
demonstrate athletic superiority and in extension, ideological superiority over their Western 
German counterparts. The bidding to host major sporting events such as the Olympic Games 
and the Football World Cup is a fiercely contested process even though many host countries 
are unable to recoup all their financial investments after hosting these events. An intangible 
and an unquantifiable factor behind the fierce competition to host such major sporting events 
is the international prestige and stature gained in successfully hosting major sporting events. 
This goes a long way to make the host country or the athletically successful country very 
attractive to other countries, a major coup for soft power. 
 Although Qatar is far from being a major world power in any sport, it has been 
aggressively seeking and successfully hosting major sporting events. It successfully hosted 
the XV Asian Games in 2006 and recently won the bid to host the 2022 World Cup amid 
allegations of vote buying which threatens to undermine this tremendous accomplishment. 
Winning the right to host the World Cup has greatly enhanced the image and reputation of 
Qatar in the Middle East and among Muslims around the world, just as South Africa’s hosting 
of the 2010 World Cup was a major source of pride for the entire African continent. 
  A successful hosting will further cement the reputation and level of Qatari 
attractiveness in the Middle Eastern region thereby boosting its influence in the Middle East 
and the Muslim world in general. When countries host major sports events, the best of their 
                                                          
19 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 
and Social Science 616 (2008), p. 105  
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culture and hospitality is also on display and depending on how attractive it is, it can greatly 
enhance the image of the host nation. One cannot under-estimate the impact of the captivating 
acrobatics and fire displays during the Beijing Olympics and the James Bond themed cameo 
of the Queen of England during the London Olympics. Joseph Nye has identified culture as 
one of the main resources of soft-power, particularly in places where it is attractive.20 
 Qatar is also using sports to build its soft power beyond its shores through sponsorship 
deals with famous European sporting giants and outright purchase of major European football 
clubs. For example, in 2010, FC Barcelona accepted the Qatar Foundation logo in place of the 
UNICEF logo ending more than a century of tradition by signing a commercial shirt 
sponsorship package worth $190 million dollars. In 2011, Qatar also purchased the iconic but 
cash strapped Parisian football club, Paris Saint-German. Thus using its immense financial 
resources to invest in an immensely popular global sport, Qatar is tactfully increasingly its 
global profile via football diplomacy.21 
 Drawing a parallel, with the long held soft power advantage of American culture in the 
world, Coruzzi posits that Qatari investment in football will serve “a similar purpose to that of 
Hollywood. Sports, like movies, are extremely popular in all ranks of society. Just like the 
world learned to love America through Marlon Brando and Marilyn Monroe, so too will the 
world learn about Qatar through Paris-Saint Germain.”22 
 
Foreign Aid 
 The world giving index 2011, ranked Qatar in 20th place based on the percentage of 
population giving and the first in terms of the Middle Eastern region and Arab countries.23 
Countries that integrate substantial foreign aid in their foreign policy generally generate 
positive goodwill as it enhances their reputation among the beneficiaries. In international 
relations, today’s aid beneficiary is a potential future ally via soft power influence and as Nye 
puts it “When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less 
resistance to their wishes."24 According to Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Ministry, the total 
developmental and humanitarian aid given by the Qatari government between 2010-2011 
amounted to over 1 billion U.S dollars.25 
 Notable among Qatar’s giving is a one billion dollar loan to Tunisia with a 2.5% 
interest rate and a promise to employ 20,000 Tunisians to work in Qatar.26 Similarly, Qatar 
has decided to invest 29 million Euros in subsidized housing in Tunisia which will provide 
810 housing units in Sejoumi in the Tunis governorate.27 This aid comes at an opportune time 
for Tunisia which went through a tumultuous democratic transition sparked primarily by 
agitations for more employment opportunities and democratic reforms. Qatar’s financial 
assistance and offer of employment for Tunisians will go a long way, to ingratiate the Qatari 
government to Tunisians. This will make the Tunisian government and public opinion more 
                                                          
20 Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science 
and Social Science 616, no. 1 (2008), 94.  
21Damien Corruzzi,  “Qatar: Football as Soft Power,” Columbia  Political Review, 2013,  
http://cpreview.org/2013/02/qatar-football-as-soft-power/ (25 June, 2013)     
22 Ibid 
23 Charities Aid Foundation, “World Giving Index 2011,” Charities Aid Foundation, 2011, 
https://www.cafonline.org/pdf/worldgiving index 2011 191211.pdf ( 20 June, 2013) 
24 J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (2004), p. 10 
25 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Humanitarian Aid in Two Years Exceeds QR 5 BN,” Qatar Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, N.d, http://english.mofa.gov.qa/newsPage.cfm?newsid=22196 (25 June, 2013) 
26Jihen Laghmari, “Qatar Giving Tunisia $1 Billion Loan, May Provide Jobs,” Bloomberg, 2012, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-26/qatar-giving-tunisia-1-billion-loan-may-provide-jobs.html  (25 
June, 2013). 
27ANSAmed. “Qatar Gives Tunisia EUR 29 mln for Subsidized Housing,” ANSAmed, 2013, 
http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/sections/economics/2013/03/13/Qatar-gives-Tunisia-EUR-29-mln-
subsidised-housing8392367.html (25 June, 2013) 
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susceptible to Qatari influence because the latter will be viewed as having demonstrated 
commitment to the welfare of Tunisians in times of need.  
 In addition, Qatar has given cash strapped Egypt a loan facility of 3 billion dollars28 
and pledged five free cargoes of liquefied petroleum gas to assist Egypt this summer.29 This 
aid from Qatar was aimed at shoring up the Islamic Brotherhood government of Morsi, a 
major ally of Qatar at a time that the West was hesitant to grant the Morsi government 
financial assistance pending some political reforms. By providing financial assistance to 
Egypt at a critical time of need, Qatar was positioned to influence Egyptian politics and at the 
same time ingratiate itself to Egyptian public opinion in the post-Mubarak era. According to 
Nye “Shaping public opinion becomes even more important where authoritarian governments 
have been replaced by new democracies.”30 However, the toppling of Morsi could seriously 
undermine Qatar’s image in Egypt as the former would be viewed negatively for investing in 
a failed cause.  
 Qatar’s indiscriminate humanitarian assistance could yield strong foreign relations 
dividends from the recipient governments and countries in the foreseeable future as Qatar will 
become an attractive country to deal with. The provision of $100 million dollars assistance to 
the U.S in the wake of a devastating natural disaster such as Katrina will help soften the 
image of Qatar among the U.S public which is very hostile towards Arabs and suspicious of 
Muslims as a result of 9/11. For risk averse and opinion poll conscious American politicians, 
this will reduce the political transaction cost of engaging Qatar in foreign policy issues since 
the former can now show to the American public a tangible deed of the Qatari government to 
make the case that Qatar is an American ally worthy of engagement. Nye posits that "in 
democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway 
to adopt tactics and strike deals than in autocracies".31  
 
Challenges to Qatari Soft Power 
Promoting Values without Practicing 
 On a global scale, Qatar is not faring well in terms of practicing democracy internally 
and serving as a good democratic role model in the Middle East. According to the 2010 
Democracy Index released by the Economic Intelligence Unit, Qatar ranked 137 out of 167. A 
contributory factor to Qatar’s low democratic ranking is its 0 rating in electoral process and 
pluralism.32 This ranking shows that indeed Qatar is an authoritarian regime and lacks the 
moral authority to be the torch bearer of democracy in the Middle East.  
 During an official visit to the White House, President Obama praised then Emir of 
Qatar for his diplomatic and military support in toppling the Gaddafi regime. However, has 
acknowledged Qatar’s awkward position as a flawed messenger of democracy, by observing 
that “He, Al-Thani, is a very influential guy but he himself is not reforming significantly.”33  
 According to Nye promoting a set of political values could be a major booster to soft 
power influence “when the promoter adheres to them at home and abroad” and pursues 
                                                          
28Bourzou Daraghi, “Qatar Gives Egypt $3bn Aid Package,” Financial Times, 2013, from 
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“foreign policies regarded as legitimate and having moral authority”34 In order for Qatar’s 
democratic advocacy to be effective and persuasive for its recipients, Qatar would have to 
lead by example by practicing what it preaches. It is far difficult and unattractive to promote a 
policy based on do as I say, not as I do. As the cliché goes, action speaks louder than words. 
  
Over Reliance on “Carrots” and Backlash 
 Qatar risks a global backlash even in recipient countries of Qatari investments and 
foreign aid if it is perceived as buying influence. While the elites in countries where Qatar is 
investing or donating money may court or welcome Qatari money, a segment of the 
population may resent this and view this as an attempt by Qatar to prop up a political faction 
within the country. At worse, the sheer volume of Qatar’s investment could unnerve the 
sensibilities of domestic actors already blaming global forces for their economic plight in a 
difficult global economic environment. Under such circumstances, Qatar risks losing the 
hearts and minds of the people that they hope to court for future engagements. 
 There is growing resentment throughout Europe and the Middle East as a result of 
recent Qatari investments. In the Middle East, there are grumblings against Qatar for 
purchasing the downfall of Gadhafi among others. After initially hailing Qatar for its role in 
toppling Arab Dictators, protestors in Libya burnt the Qatari flag for funding the Muslim 
Brotherhood there. After giving Egypt $3 billion dollars, some Egyptians burned Qatari flag 
and accused their government of selling the country to Qatar. Meanwhile rumors continue to 
swirl among Egyptians that Qatar might purchase the Suez Canal in spite of numerous denials 
from both governments. Furthermore, anti-Qatar demonstrations flared up after Qatar 
promised a $1 billion dollar loan prompting an embarrassed Tunisian government to rebuke 
its citizens for insulting a country that is helping them.35 
  In France, the backlash against Qatari investments is being spearheaded at the elite 
level among far right politicians who are particularly incensed about Qatar’s plans to invest in 
low-income “banlieues”. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far right party, Front National who 
scored about 20% of the votes in the last Presidential elections has labeled Qatari investment 
plans as an “Islamic Trojan Horse.” This has resonated with a segment of French citizens in 
the midst of economic and political anxieties.36 
 
Limitations of “Carrot” Diplomacy 
 Qatar is not universally identified with a particular set of values or ideals that others 
will voluntarily embrace without inducements and this can make their soft power influence 
fleeting. Buttressing this point Nye posits that "When you can get others to admire your ideals 
and to do want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to 
move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many 
values like democracy and human rights, and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.37 
 Many people imitate Americans not because they are coaxed to do so but they are 
motivated to do so and they are willing to learn and adopt American ways of thinking or 
doing things because they think it's a better option. However, what will happen if Qatar is no 
longer able to deliver the “carrots” when it faces economic crises as it is cyclical with 
resource dependent economies? Will countries welcome Qatar to mediate their problems and 
will the influence of Qatar remain the same or fade away when it can no longer deliver the 
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“carrots"? Nye argues that a powerful country should set the values and others would follow 
without any external influence and notes that motivation plays a major role in soft power.38 
Citing the United States as a case study, Nye points out that the U.S set the standards for 
democracy and a set of ideals romanticized around the world as the “American dream” for 
people to follow.39  
 
Qatar’s Questionable Friends         
Qatar has cultivated and built strong relationships with diverse Islamist groups across 
the Middle East and exert considerable influence on them primarily through the provision of 
“carrots”. These groups include Muslim brotherhood branches in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and to 
some extent Turkey and Hamas in Gaza. In addition, Qatar host a number of 
brotherhood/Islamist dissidents from neighboring Gulf countries such Saudi Arabia and the 
U.A.E much to the consternation of these countries. With Qatar overtly providing financial 
and moral support to Islamists in the region, any deviation from democratic norms by the 
latter regimes will severely dent the international image of Qatar thereby undermining their 
soft power credentials. 
 If Qatar’s Islamist allies are able to consolidate democratic ideals and meet the 
aspirations of their people, then Qatar’s image will be enhanced in the region and become a 
major source of attraction, a sine-qua non for soft power influence. However, recent events in 
Egypt where millions of Egyptians marched on the streets and forced the ouster of 
Brotherhood President Morsi for betraying their democratic aspirations, does not bode well 
for the image of Qatar in Egypt and beyond. In this regard, Nye warns that “The reputation 
and credibility of a state or group seeking to exert soft-power influence also matters 
particularly because of the “paradox of plenty” 39 F40. Thus any information perceived as 
propaganda may not just be treated with contempt but may also be counterproductive if it 
undermines the reputation of the provider of the information.40F41 
 
The Perils of Creeping Hard Power  
 As Nye points out, one of the resources of soft power is foreign policy if it is viewed 
as having moral authority. He adds that “When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes 
of others, our soft power is enhanced".41F42 In this regard, Qatar has earned tremendous amount 
of goodwill in the Middle East for its role in defeating the Ghadhafi regime and humanitarian 
and military support for the Syrian rebels against the Assad regime. However, such unbridled 
use of hard power could backfire and could damage Qatar’s reputation in the long run as there 
have been credible reports of atrocities committed by some of the Qatari backed rebels in 
Syria. There are also serious fears that Qatar may be supporting the most radical elements of 
the rebels with illiberal motives with ties with Al Qaeda. This fear was conveyed by U.S 
President Barack Obama to the Emir of Qatar during an April 23, 2013 meeting in which the 
former is “said to have spoken in blunt terms about Qatar’s support for jihadists and to have 
warned that Qatari backing of Al-Qaeda-like groups would pose a direct challenge to the 
national-security interests of the U.S. The emir was said to have agreed with the president 
wholeheartedly on the matter.”42F43 
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 Qatar will be better served by preserving its main sources of attraction in order to 
continue exercising soft power influence in its sphere of influence. In this regard, it should re-
align its regional foreign policy goals with that of its major security benefactor the U.S. by re-
evaluating its support for Islamist groups that the U.S is suspicious of or disapproves. In order 
to be taken seriously as a champion of the movement for democratic change that is currently 
sweeping across the region, Qatar should accelerate the pace of its own long over-due 
democratic reforms by at least releasing all political dissidents and permitting elective 
municipal and parliamentary elections with real legislative powers. This should be 
supplemented with labor reforms for the millions of migrant laborers that are fueling Qatar’s 
economic and construction boom. Failure to do this could put Qatar under unnecessary 
international scrutiny that could undermine its image and thus soft power capability as it 
prepares to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022. 
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